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In this paper I will show how Wittgenstein's 
concept of seeing-as might serve as the foundation for 
a theory of art. The theory that I will develop is a 
sketch, and general themes will take precedence over 
details. I will describe a way of distinguishing be-
tween art objects and other objects, consider what 
makes art, art, give a Wittgensteinian 'definition' of 
art appreciation, examine various important sorts of 
reactions to artworks, and briefly wonder what life 
without art would be like. I presuppose some under-
standing of several of Wittgenstein's central concepts 
in the Philosophical Investigations: language-games, 
forms of life, and the function of learning in under-
standing how to use concepts. 
I will draw examples and ideas from both the Phil-
osophical Investigations and the Lectures on Aes-
thetics. In spite of the specificity of the subject 
matter of the latter, I have often found Wittgenstein's 
remarks in the former to be more illuminating, because 
more suggestive, on the topics of art and aesthetics. 
Also, it is not clear how much weight should be at-
tached to ideas in the Lectures on Aesthetics since 
Wittgenstein neither organized nor published them 
himself. However, it is well to note that what he ap-
parently regarded to be the strict subject matter of 
aesthetics is treated there rather than in the Inves-
tigations . 
When Wittgenstein talks about aesthetics, he means 
more than just art. I will talk almost exclusively a-
bout art. Therefore, what Wittgenstein said about aes-
thetics will here be made appropriate to a discusssion 
about art. Although 'art' and 'aesthetics' are often 
used interchangeably, I will attempt to restrict my use 
of the term 'aesthetics' to instances where: the use 
of 'art' is ungrammatical, the topic being discussed is 
clearly applicable outside the domain of what I will 
strictly define as art, or I am quoting or referring to 
something specific that Wittgenstein said. 
How do artworks differ from other objects? 1 As 
physical objects which can be examined for similarities 
and differences with other physical objects, probably 
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not at all. True, artworks are pieces of canvas pulled 
taut over wood frames with pigments smeared over them; 
they are hunks and strands of metal twisted and hung 
and perched on bases of wood or plaster or stone; they 
are little circles with variously flagged lines stick-
ing upward or downward out of them, organized on pieces 
of specially prepared paper so as to signify the possi-
bility of sound. Or, in their performed form, they are 
the sounds themselves. Non-art objects are generally 
none of these things. If we recognize something as a 
painting or a sonata or a sculpture, does that make it 
art? These differences between art objects and other 
objects at the physical level do not seem relevant. 
Art objects are things that we do something partic-
ular with; namely, we place ourselves in a particular 
relationship to them, and we do not relate in the same 
way to non-art objects. I do not want to settle the 
question here as to what are to be considered works of 
art versus what are not. What is important is that we 
do treat a fairly commonly accepted variety of things 
as art objects, the obvious examples being paintings 
and sculptures, as well as music, poetry, and dances. 
Their variety is suggestive of the similarly wide range 
of relationships which exist between art objects and 
audience. We go to museums and galleries to look at 
them, to concert halls and theatres to see and hear 
them performed. Works of art are things that we look 
at, listen to, observe, scrutinize, and experience in a 
peculiarly appreciative way. In order to illuminate 
the uniqueness of this relationship between artworks 
and the art audience, I will explore the concepts of 
art and art appreciation through an application of 
Wittgenstein's notion of seeing-as. I hope to 
demonstrate how seeing-as is an experiential concept 
which is particularly well-suited to the foundation of 
a theory of art. 
To see something as something is to see it as 
something that it is perceptually not. In other words, 
whatever is seen and recognized to be what it is, is 
not seen as any particular thing, but it is merely per-
ceived. Ä person who sees some ordinary object and re-
cognizes it for what it is, is likely to say, 'I see 
this', and upon prompting may produce a description, a 
drawing, or a copy, to illustrate what is seen. The 
word 'copy' is to be understood as the paradigm for 
whatever description, drawing, etc. may issue forth; 
the point is that purely perceptual experience results 
in non-innovative, relatively uninteresting utterances, 
if utterances are made. What is seen is not inter-
preted, nor is it related or compared to other things. 
It might be said that the seeing of it is simply 
recorded, and the recording is then available for the 
construction of a description or the making of a copy. 
Thus, we would not say of a knife and fork, 'Now I am 
seeing this as a knife and fork', of the letter 'F', 
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"Now I am seeing this as the letter ' F' ", or of 
Jastrow's duck-rabbit, 'Now I am seeing it as a duck-
rabbit 1 . Wittgenstein says that none of these expres-
sions would be understood. We cannot make sense of ex-
pressions which are attempts to take things as what 
they are, because there is no sense to be made of our 
making an effort to take things as what they are. To 
do that would be, Wittgenstein suggests, like trying to 
move one's mouth when one eats. We just do move our 
mouths when we eat; that is part of what eating is. 
Similarly, we just do call a knife, 'knife', a fork, 
•fork*, and the letter 'F', WF". Using these names for 
these things is playing the language-game that we do, 
in fact, play. We do not try to play this language-
game of calling things the names we have given them. 
We play it. 
What is peculiar about seeing something as some-
thing is that such an experience is not part of per-
ception. It is, in fact, not 'seeing' at all, but is 
an experience that v/e want to call 'seeing' because it 
is so similar. We want to say that seeing-as is like 
seeing, but in an important sense, it is not. The non-
perceptual nature of seeing-as can best be explained by 
giving examples which bring out the contrast between 
perceptual seeing and seeing-as and their associated 
verbal and non-verbal reactions. 
Imagine that tv/o people have the following similar 
reactions to Jastrow's duck-rabbit drawing: One person 
looks, sees the rabbit, and says, 'It's a rabbit*. The 
second person looks, sees the duck, and then suddenly 
notices that the picture harbors a rabbit-aspect. He 
exclaims, 'Mow it's a rabbit!' The first person de-
scribes by his utterance what he perceives, which is 
the rabbit, but only the rabbit-aspect of what we know 
to be a drawing of a duck-rabbit. Why not simply say 
the same thing of the second person, that he at first 
perceives the duck, then the rabbit, and consequently 
the duck-rabbit? To describe the situation in this way 
is to fail to confront that fact the something was 
realized, that an aspect was noticed; more happened 
than that a series of things was merely perceived. It 
occurs to us that something has changed, and our first 
inclination is to attribute this change to the object 
itself. However, it cannot be anything that the object 
itself does, for then it would be as if the object al-
tered before our eyes. The aspect dawns on us. 
Noticing an aspect, or seeing something as something 
that it is perceptually not, is something we do. In-
terestingly, it follows that the noticing of an aspect 
often elicits from us not a report of a perception, but 
an exclamation. We say, 'Oh look, I see this now!' and 
the ambiguity, as Wittgenstein calls it, of the picture 
does not escape us, as it escapes the person who merely 
perceives the rabbit and reports, 'It's a rabbit'. 
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The question arises: Is there a class of objects 
such that our relations to them are never merely per-
ceptual, but are always the noticing of aspects about 
them, and seeing them as things which they are percep-
tualy not? I would like to suggest that art objects 
are such objects, and I will present evidence to show 
that Wittgenstein would be supportive of this view. 
Ordinary objects need not be seen as anything at 
all. We need not look at them or listen to them or in-
teract with them in any way and feel compelled to do 
anything other than report on what we see or hear, if 
that. Although it at first seems as though we can say 
the same thing about works of art, that we need not see 
them as anything or need not offer anything in excess 
of a report, such as, 'There were blue squares and 
brown circles', to take this as the outstanding com-
parison between artworks and ordinary objects is to 
miss the fact that there are physical art objects, and 
then there is art. An art object is a work of art when 
it is seen as something that it is perceptually not. 
It is the noticing of aspects of an art object that 
transforms that object into art. An art object cannot 
be art if it is merely perceived, for then it is no 
longer a work of art. This statement may seem circu-
lar, but to see that it is not we need only ask what 
things we in fact call art. How do we use the word 
'art'? We apply the term 'art' most readily then we 
encounter objects that strike us in a certain way. The 
nature of this striking need not be a mystery; we see 
art objects as things which they are perceptually not. 
To say this is not to deny that we perceive them; it is 
just to acknowledge that it is not for the sake of per-
ception itself that we travel all over the world, among 
other things, to see them. We seek to experience them. 
They are more than splotches of color, chunks of metal, 
human figures leaping across a stage. We see them as 
more than this. Vie notice things about them, and this 
is what makes art. 
We would treat any ordinary objects in the same way 
as we treat art objects if there were absolutely no 
difference between the objects themselves. As I have 
suggested however, it cannot be their purely physical 
makeup that distinguishes them. Art objects are funda-
mentally capable of being seen as what they are percep-
tually not, and although we regularly notice aspects of 
ordinary objects as well, I would like to suggest that 
they do not fundamentally possess the capacity to be 
seen as what they perceptually are not. I will thus 
say that art objects are fundamentally expressive and 
that this is the objective basis of our taking them as 
works of art. 
Here, as before, we do not need to draw a sharp 
line between two classes of objects, nor need we ignore 
the fact that many ordinary objects have expressive 
capabilities very similar to those of art objects. 
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What is important is the difference in the way we treat 
art objects versus other objects, and this mode of 
treatment, this relationship that we maintain with 
works of art, is suggestive of the fact that whatever 
objects we treat in this way are fundamentally capable 
of being treated in this way. To say that expressive-
ness is fundamental is not to claim that it is any less 
the way things just happen to be than any other of our 
forms of life. It is just to be ready to admit that an 
expressive quality is the basis of what art is. It is 
what we expect of artworks. 
We must tread carefully when attributing qualities 
to objects. There is a sense in which Wittgenstein 
might admit that we can call art objects fundamentally 
expressive and a sense in which he certainly would not. 
The physical objects themselves clearly cannot possess 
the nonobservable property of expressiveness, for what 
is there in terms of what they physically are is there 
for all eyes to see. Yet, many people simply do not 
see the 'expressive character' of various art objects 
whose aspects are, for one reason or another, opaque to 
them. Expressiveness does not reside in art objects, 
but we've seen that it is partially a function of the 
way in which we treat these privileged objects. But 
this is only to consider the point of view of the au-
dience of artworks. The remainder of the story can be 
gotten by investigating the relationship between art 
object, expression, and the creator or performer. 
An artist creates a work of art in order to bring 
into being an object which will be part of the exclu-
sive community of objects whose sole purpose for ex-
istence is to serve as vehicles for expression. So ex-
pressiveness can in a very vivid sense be said to in-
here in works of art; they are created to be taken as 
expressive by the community. A performer, likewise, 
seeks to bring to the audience the expressive character 
of a work. Here it is not important what an artist 
wants his work to express or whether he is capable of 
making it express anything in particular. Much of the 
intent behind artistic creation is to bring forth ob-
jects of which people will notice aspects, i.e. which 
v/ill be seen as things that they are perceptually not. 
So not only is this the way in which art is received; 
it is also the way in which it is given. Art objects 
have, as the motivation behind their creation, a funda-
mental expressivity. 
It is not by way of their physical being that art-
works are expressive. It is by way of their playing a 
certain role in the community, of fulfilling the needs 
and expectations of both the artist and the audience, 
and of being the crux of the form of life we call 
aesthetics. Thus, art objects as art are not identical 
with the physical objects that they also are. 
The distinction between physical art objects and 
artworks might erroneously give rise to the picture 
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that the two are quite different things. Wittgenstein 
would not sanction the existence of ethereal artwork-
things somehow perhaps capable of existing even if 
their physical counterparts were to disappear. 'It is 
a 3 if artworks live on in us', some would say, 'even 
when we aren't faced with them'. This picture is 
grossly mistaken. Artworks cannot exist, phantom-like, 
in the minds of their audience. They must be what they 
physically are. Expressiveness is not a quality which 
exceeds their physical being in such a way that it can 
be divorced from them, usurped by us. Yes, we remember 
them; but to remember something is not to possess it in 
phantom form. An art object must first of all be per-
ceived in order for it to even be possible for it to be 
art. Perception is the foundation for all of our in-
terpretations, for the dawning of every aspect upon us, 
for the seeing of every artwork as something, for tak-
ing it in a certain way. Art object and artwork are 
the same thing, yet different in character. Perception 
and seeing-as are different games. What v/e see art ob-
jects as are works of art, and this is the first game 
we play with these particular physical objects. 
When a person perceives a physical object which is 
expressively an artwork, and yet does not take it ex-
pressively, but sees only the physical object and is 
only able to report on its existence, to describe it, 
then we must say that this object is not art for this 
person at this time. Alternative interpretations of 
such cases are unrealistic in the sense that they are 
not accommodated by our language-games. What if we in-
stead say that anything which the community calls art 
(or which the artist calls a work of art) is art for 
everyone at all times? We are then left with a group 
of purely physical objects which may or may not have 
any experiential significance for any given person at 
any given time. Art which is just called art is no 
longer fundamentally expressive. It has lost its mean-
ing, and we are left with a useless and inappropriate 
distinction between one type of object and all others, 
where there once existed the useful and appropriate 
distinction between those -objects which have a funda-
mentally expressive character which is capable of being 
grasped by some portion of the community, and those ob-
jects which do not have a fundamentally expressive 
character. 
Because it is the most in conformity with our ac-
tual practice, the most realistic way to treat cases in 
which a particular person does not take an art object 
expressively at a given time, is to say that that wox-k 
of art is not art for that person at that time. Much 
of what Wittgenstein says supports this view. A person 
may be perfectly willing to admit that when he does not 
take something as anything, and therefore does not ap-
preciate the expressive character of a creation, it is 
not precluded that others may do so, and therefore 
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others may see that same object as a work of art. One 
interpretation of the recognition by a person that 
others see an art object as art would be that that per-
son also sees the object as art. Can't his admission 
that something is art be based on other people's in-
terpretations? Since he does not, himself, appreciate 
the art object, this interpretation is really sense-
less. The art object has no expressive quality for 
him. If he does not experience this for himself, then 
the art object is not art. Any person that does not 
see an art object as art for himself is only able to 
blandly say such things as, 'I will agree that this is 
art'. But he will not be able to make such vital con-
tributions to an undersanding of the artwork as are in-
dicated by statements like, 'See what it looks like if 
you watch it from over here', 'Now I see this 1' and 
'I've seen this painting a hundred times and there's 
something I never noticed before'. A person who cannot 
make useful appreciative statements about a work of art 
does not see the art object as art but maintains an ex-
ternal relationship to its artistic character. 
How can we tell whether an art object is art for a 
particular person? Wittgenstein suggests that we focus 
on the concept of appreciation: 
In what we call the Arts a person who has judge-
ment develops. (A person who has a judgement 
doesn't mean a person who says 'Marvellous!' at 
certain things.) If we talk of aesthetic judge-
ments, we think, among a thousand things, of the 
Arts. When we make an aesthetic judgement about 
a thing we do not just gape at it and say: 'Oh! 
How marvellous!' We distinguish between a person 
who knows what he is talking about and a person 
who doesn't. (Lectures on Aesthetics, I #17, p. 
Those people who know what they are talking about are 
able to appreciate the art object as art. The point is 
as simple as the recognition that someone who is to ad-
mire an English sonnet must know English. Someone who 
speaks only Russian cannot truly be overwhelmed by an 
English sonnet. A person who says, 'Ah!' when a par-
ticular piece of music is played, but who cannot hum 
the melody, identify the movements, and say when the 
bass came in, can perhaps be said not to have appreci-
ated the piece any more than a dog does in wagging his 
tail when the music is played. Wittgenstein is not 
trying to grind a fine line here in distinguishing what 
counts as appreciation from all else, he doesn't need 
to because his point is easy to see: Appreciation of 
art objects has to do with being able to see what's in 
them. I say, 'Appreciation . . . has to do with . . . ' 
rather than 'Appreciation is . . . ' because the 
concept of appreciation is not easy to describe, and is 
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impossible to define. In discussing a Wittgensteinian 
concept, we presume that: 1) an understanding of the 
concept is more likely to be generated not from what 
can be said definitionally or descriptively about the 
concept, but in terms of what can be shown by means of 
examples, and 2) it is nearly impossible to conceive of 
the concepts as being fixed or static, but because of 
our inability to attach a definition to them, and like-
wise because of the parts that they play in our con-
stantly evolving and mutating language-games, they are 
more easily seen as fluid. Thus, since "(w)hat belongs 
to a language-game is a whole culture" (Lectures on 
Aesthetics, I #26, p. 8 ) , n(i)t is not only difficult 
to describe what appreciation consists in, but im-
possible. To describe what it consists in we would 
have to describe the whole environment" (Lectures on 
Aesthetics, I ft7, p. 7 ) . Appreciation of art is con-
textual . 
If a person is able to truly appreciate a work of 
art then what he says will indicate that he 'knows his 
way about', a familiar idea in the Investigations. The 
criterion for our being appreciative of works of art 
will not be that we have certain inner pictures upon 
contact with-these works, but that we are able to gen-
erate descriptions of the impressions that we have. 
Art appreciation is a language-game. That we can and 
very often do emit appropriate exclamations of various 
sorts when in the presence of a work of art; this is 
the criterion by which we judge appreciation. Appre-
ciation would be nothing at all if there were no con-
text in which we appreciated. We could not appreciate 
art alone. The lone inhabitant of a planet could never 
appreciate a work of art in the sense of appreciation 
which we know. Art appreciation for us is a language-
game that is part of our culture. It has to do with 
what we know, what we are familiar with. 
We are familiar with the concept of seeing art ob-
jects as art. The primary sense in which the concept 
of seeing-as enters into a discussion of art is the 
general sense in which art objects are seen as expres-
sive will differ for each member of the community. 
Recall that expressivity does not define the art object 
because 1) not all objects which a person will admit to 
be art have an expressive character for that person, 
and 2) expressivity is a non-physical property which 
the physical art object cannot possess. The seeing of 
art objects as art, the recognizing of certain art ob-
jects that they are art, is the first aspect which must 
be noticed about an artwork if any further aesthetic 
appreciation is to ensue. Wittgenstein does not di-
rectly address this issue, however his comments on aes-
thetic appreciation are enlightening. 
The members of an audience exhibit different de-
grees of appreciation of a work of art. The unin-
teresting, because uninformed reaction of some is a 
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simple 'Ah' or 'Oh'. Those who are familiar with the 
art form or the particular work will be able to say 
much more, and consequently will be able to make judge-
ments about the work. If there were no question of not 
seeing art objects as art, then what was art would be 
art for everyone. There would be different degrees of 
discerning tastes but all tastes would be discerning 
and every judgement would be valid, informed, a legiti-
mate show of appreciation. Further, no one would be 
able to admit, 'That is not art for me!'. The expres-
sion would have no sense. What would the significance 
of the expressive character of art then be? Artworks 
could not be artworks because of their fundamental ex-
pressivity, for expressiveness is an aspect of some-
thing which has to be taken. If art objects just were 
art and were not taken to be so by anyone, then either 
artworks could not be fundamentally expressive, in 
which case it would be hard to see what their being art 
consisted in, or their expressivity would be irrelevant 
to their being art, in which case it would be difficult 
to see what possible function their expressivity could 
have. Wittgenstein does not discuss whether or how we 
take art objects as art, but his views on aesthetics 
which emerge in the context of his discussion of 
seeing-as are conducive to an adoption of the view that 
art is art because art objects are taken aesthetically 
by the community; this shows by way of the fact that 
aesthetic appreciation is a language-game that we do 
play, and aesthetics is a form of life which v/e do 
have. 
Here it occurs to me that in conversations on 
aesthetic matters we use the words: 'You have to 
see it like this. This is how it is meant'; 
'When you see it like this, you see where it goes 
wrong'; 'You have to hear this bar as an 
introduction'; 'You must hear it in this key'; 
'You must phrase it like this' (which can refer 
to hearing as well as playing). (Philosophical 
Investigations, Ilxi, p. 202) 
'Now he's seeing it like this', 'now like that' 
would only be said of someone capable of making 
certain applications of the figure quite freely. 
The substratum of this experience is the 
mastery of a technique." (Philosophical Investi-
gations, Ilxi, p. 208) 
Wittgenstein is much more explicit in explaining 
what the mastery of the technique of aesthetic appreci-
ation consists of. In other words, at the level of 
what are actual reactions, responses, and interpreta-
tions of works of art, Wittgenstein offers examples 
prolifically. 
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In many cases, the examples he provides are not in-
tended to specifically illustrate a point about art or 
aesthetics. Yet they have a curiously aesthetic sense, 
which is highlighted by the occasional references to 
music, poetry, and the pervasiveness of the ideas of 
pictures and drawings. Wittgenstein's discussion of 
seeing, and "the difference of category between the two 
'objects' of sight" (Philosophical Investigations, p. 
193) serves as an excellent springboard for aesthetic 
indulgences. 
Simply seeing a work of art and seeing it as some-
thing are two entirely different modes of apprehending 
the art object. In the first instance, the artwork is 
merely a perceived object, and the viewer might be able 
to produce a description, a drawing, or a copy of what 
is perceived. A copy or a description is, in fact, all 
that could be expected from a person who could in no 
sense be said to understand the artwork, who could pro-
duce no verbal or gestural signals of having truly ap-
preciated it by way of making judgements about it based 
on his familiarity with works of its type, or works 
produced by the same culture or during the same age. 
It is easy to think of examples of what someone who 
does not understand or appreciate an artwork, who does 
not experience it, who does not recognize its expres-
sive character, and who therefore, does not take it as 
art, does or says. And what someone does or says is 
that by which we tell what significance the object has 
had for them. A museum patron may say of Rothko, 'Oh, 
he just paints colored squares'. or 'What lovely paint-
ings of colored squares he does'. A concert-goer may 
remark of a Stravinsky piece, 'I can't hear the mel-
ody', or of a John Cage composition, 'The order of the 
notes makes no sense'. A novice viewer of the ballet 
might simply say, 'Oh look! They're pointing their 
toes. It's lovely!'. Uninformed reactions may be 
positive, negative, or neither. Clearly, these art ob-
jects have not been taken as art by their viewers. 
They have simply been perceived and the result is some 
description which serves as a copy or which replicates 
in words what the viewer has seen (or heard), but no 
more. These are the kinds of things that we expect 
people to say when an artwork has made no impression on 
them, when their seeing has not been seeing-as. They 
have noticed no aspects about the art object, or at 
least none that convince them of its status as art. 
Remember Jastrow's duck-rabbit and the person who 
'notices' the rabbit and remarks, 'It's a rabbit?'. 
The person has not noticed the rabbit-aspect however, 
but has merely seen the rabbit. The ambiguity of the 
picture is thus lost upon him. Likewise here, a person 
may accidently, as it were, 'notice an aspect' of a 
work of art. A John Cage piece, for example, may con-
sist of* a series of notes arranged according to no 
prior 'sense', and to truly notice this would be an 
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astute observation. But for the person who unwittingly 
reports upon it as upon a perception, it will not be as 
if he has noticed an aspect. That was merely what he 
perceived when he viewed the art object, and was cer-
tainly no manifestation of his seeing the art object as 
a work of art. 
There is a continuity between the above-given de-
scriptions, which might be made by art viewers perceiv-
ing art objects without seeing them as art, and the ex-
amples of primitive or unappreciative reactions to art 
objects that Wittgenstein actually provides in the 
Lectures on Aesthetics. Nonappreciative gaping perhaps 
accompanied by uninformed comments such as 'Oh!', 
'Ah!', 'How marvellous!', or 'How awful!' (a possible 
uninformed reaction to a Picasso or a Dali, or perhaps 
a musical composition on synthesizer), are similarly 
indicative of the fact that a person has not really ap-
preciated the artistry of an art object. In fact, if 
such a person were asked to elaborate on his initial 
primitive reaction, he might respond with such descrip-
tions as appear in the previous paragraph. In other 
words, uninformed art viewers are unlikely to be able 
to articulate more than a series of unappreciative 
reactions to works of art, even if pressed. In order 
to see in exactly what sense these cases can be said to 
be cases of persons not seeing art objects as art, not 
noticing aspects of the artworks except accidently, it 
will be useful to examine what sorts of reactions will 
count as cases of genuine appreciation. 
It is because a person can see an art object as an 
artwork that he is able to notice aspects of that art-
work, to see it as things that it perceptually is not. 
An aspect can never be noticed if the art object is not 
first taken as art, for then there is no noticing by 
the viewer but only perceiving, out of which a mere de-
scription or replication of the perception in words or 
drawings can ensue. Supporting this claim are two 
assumptions: 1) The noticing of aspects of artworks is 
derivative of their status as art, 2) If an aspect of 
an artwork is noticed, and it is not derivative of the 
status of the object as art, then that aspect is ir-
relevant to the artistic value of the work. It is only 
outside of the strict boundaries of perception that 
noticing can take place, because only there can it be 
said that something is, in fact, noticed rather than 
perceived. I appeal here to Wittgenstein's idea that 
to understand the difference between two concepts, we 
must examine how we use those concepts, and the 
language-games that we play with them, and that this in 
turn depends upon how we have learned them. Thus, we 
have learned to say that we have noticed something 
about something if a framework already exists in which 
we can see the object that we are noticing things 
about. If I say, 'The room was full of sunlight', it 
is presupposed that I have had past experiences which 
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qualify roe to make this statement. I have been in 
rooms in which I was not struck by the lighting. I 
have been in rooms that have been much darker; like-
wise, rooms which were artificially lit. We are only 
equipped to notice on the basis of some familiarity, 
some contextuality, some amount of informedness, or 
some capacity for drawing relationships. The primary, 
or most general framework within which we are able to 
notice aspects of artworks is our acceptance or recog-
nition of them as works of art; and that involves, as I 
have already shown, more than the simple admission that 
something is a work of art. It involves an apprecia-
tion of the fundamental quality of expressivity of the 
work. Both the Investigations and the Lectures on 
Aesthetics shed light on the nature and extent of in-
formed aesthetic appreciation: 
It is possible - and this is important - to say a 
great deal about a fine aesthetic difference. 
The first thing you say may, of course, be just: 
1 This word fits, that doesn't'- or something of 
the kind. But then you can discuss all the ex-
tensive ramifications of the tie-up effected by 
each of the words. That first judgement is not 
the end of the matter, for it is the field of 
force of a word that is decisive. (Philosophical 
Investigations, Ilxi, p. 219.) 
In order to get clear about aesthetic words you 
have to describe ways of living. We think we 
have to talk about aesthetics judgements like 
'This is beautiful', but we find that if we have 
to talk about aesthetic judgements we don't find 
these words at all, but a word used something 
like a gesture, accompanying a complicated ac-
tivity. The judgement is a gesture accompanying 
a vast structure of actions not expressed by one 
judgement. (Lectures on Aesthetics, I #35, p. 
11.) 
What emerges from Wittgenstein's words is the im-
portance of there being a wide range of reactions to 
works of art, verbal and otherwise. Verbal reactions, 
as Wittgenstein points out, are themselves multiform, 
often in consequence of the diverse experiences which 
they make articulate. One might say upon feeling a 
certain tension while looking at a painting, 'Look! 
yellow and purple are juxtaposed there'. Or one might 
exclaim, 'Oh! It's in 3/4 time', upon hearing a piece 
of music that made one wobble in a certain way. 
Wittgenstein warns us to beware of thinking that these 
sorts of statements, which we often offer in order to 
justify our aesthetic impressions, are causal explana-
tions (Lectures on Aesthetics, III #11, p. 21). It is 
always conceivable that any explanation given would 
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simply not be the explanation. The criterion for its 
not being causal is that it cannot be "corroborated by 
experience or statistics as to how people react." 
(Lectures on Aesthetics, III #11, p. 21) Exper-
imentation is not what the understanding of aesthetic 
impressions is all about. In attempting to point out 
what it is about a painting that gives us a feeling of 
tension, or about a piece of music that gives us a wob-
bly feeling, the wrong thing could easily be pointed 
out, and the viewer might still be satisfied. State-
ments like those above are part of the behavior we ex-
hibit when we see an art object, and we want to ver-
bally manifest our experiencing of it. 
Another sort of verbal reaction to works of art can 
often not be adequately explained. We frequently do 
not know precisely why we use the words 'right' or 
'correct' in evaluating words of art or other aesthetic 
materials, when we do. In his Lectures on Aesthetics, 
Wittgenstein gives the example of a man going to his 
tailor with a jacket which he has bought, whose color 
was somehow 'just right'. As the tailor adjusts the 
length of the jacket, the man says: 'Too long', *No-
now it's too short', 'There! Just right!'. In the 
cases in which the concept of correctness is applicable 
(and it is more commonly applied by the artist or per-
former than the audience), there are often rules of 
guidance. For example, to compose a piece of music you 
can apply the rules of harmony and counterpoint. But 
when it comes to deciding which notes should be left 
out of which chords, and when the piece should be con-
cluded, not everything can be said. Much about cor-
rectness cannot be articulated or made understood, yet 
we continue to use the word 'correct' when there are no 
articulable grounds. 
Gestures are very similar to verbal reactions. In 
fact, verbal reactions can be referred to as verbal 
gestures. Wittgenstein remarks that when one says of a 
piece of Schubert's that it is melancholy, it is like 
giving that piece a face. Interestingly, Wittgenstein 
then adds that gestures (presumably nonverbal) can, in 
fact, be more exact than words (Lectures on Aesthetics, 
I #10, p. 4 ) . Nonverbal gestures would seem to include 
arm and body movements, facial expressions, the con-
struction of drawings, models, or other representations 
of aspects, and artworks themselves. Aesthetic appre-
ciation (versus appreciation of non-aesthetic objects) 
appears to Wittgenstein to be highly gestural, whether 
verbally or otherwise. A meaningful gesture can say 
more than any number of uninformed words or nonverbal 
contortions, and can even function to reveal a deep ap-
preciation of an artwork where no words are available. 
Wittgenstein relates a relevant personal anecdote: 
Once he began to stress the metre in Klopstock's poetry 
abnormally, his enjoyment and thorough appreciation of 
the poetry was manifested by his reading it again and 
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again, all the while making gestures and facial expres-
sions of approval. Yet, no words v/ere said. 
Gestural appreciation of a work of art is contin-
uous with the idea that we make verbal and nonverbal 
comparisons of works of art and noticed aspects to oth-
er things. I find Wittgenstein's comments and examples 
on the making of comparisons, the drawings of relation-
ships, and the noticing of similarities, to be among 
the most interesting statements made both throughout 
the Investigations and the Lectures on Aesthetics. 
Wittgenstein says that "(w)e find certain tilings about 
seeing puzzling, because we do not find the whole busi-
ness of seeing puzzling enough." (Philosophical Inves-
tigations, Ilxi, p. 212) This comment seems partic-
ularly applicable to these unusual cases in which com-
parisons, relationships, and similarities are them-
selves seen. The examples which are and can be given 
are so familiar to us, and yet we find them puzzling 
because there seems to be no immediate explanation of 
them. What constitutes our feeling as if the name 
'Schubert' fits " Schubert's works and Schubert's face? 
What is it about a piece of music that makes us think 
of travelling? How can a few dashes made with a pencil 
on a paper look to us like Napoleon? And why, if we 
substitute a second minuet for a certain minuet which 
makes us want to dance, do we not then feel similarly 
possessed? 
We find these cases puzzling because we do not find 
the whole business of seeing puzzling enough. Witt-
genstein says this in opposition to the several unre-
flective ideas which have come to surround the concept 
of seeing and other related concepts. He spends the. 
bulk of the Investigations attempting to undermine 
these ideas. A study of the depth grammar of 'seeing' 
leads him to replace our unreflective ideas with the 
very plausible accounts of seeing and seeing-as. They 
are so different from one another, and yet we want to 
call them such similar names. We must not let our 
grammar confuse us. There is no need for us to be 
puzzled by our ability to make comparisons and see sim-
ilarities. We do these things because we are able to 
notice aspects, and this can only take place against 
some background. We must know our way about. There 
need be no puzzles. In the realm of aesthetics, impon-
derable numbers of complexities enter into our noticing 
aspects of works of art, for our ways of living pervade 
our noticing and even influence our ability to see art 
objects as art. Why should it puzzle us that we see a 
similarity between the style of musician and the style 
of a poet who lived at the same time, that we find, for 
example, certain themes of Brahms to be Kellerian? 
(Lectures on Aesthetics, IV, p. 32) Such cases do not 
trouble Wittgenstein, although they clearly interest 
and amuse him, for it is simply not mysterious that we 
notice such things if we bcther to understand what 
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'noticing' means, what familiarity is, what similari-
ties are. It often seems to be the very business of 
art to take into account a background, to allow for 
varied interpretations and comparisons to be made. 
Such characteristics are part of the fundamental ex-
pressivity of works of art. Add to the expressivity of 
the artworks themselves the capacity of the members of 
an audience to grasp that expressivity, to see the art 
object as art, and to notice aspects of the artwork, 
and whatever puzzlement there was, is dissolved. 
Wittgenstein tells us that it was all merely grammati-
cal confusion, confusion about concepts. 
Throughout this paper, I have tried to stress the 
dependence of the ability of a viewer to notice aspects 
of a work of art, to see it as something, and to notice 
similarities or make associations between it and other 
things, upon the primary taking of the art object as 
art. Thus, not all art objects are works of art for 
all viewers at all times, and those for whom certain 
art objects are not artworks are those upon whom the 
expressive character of those art objects is lost. 
Wittgenstein asks us to imagine "human beings lacking 
in the capacity to see something as something." (Phil-
osophical Investigations, Ilxi, p. 213) One thing that 
people such as these will lack is the ability to see 
any art object as art. Art or aesthetics will not ex-
ist for them. They will not be able to play the 
language-games of art appreciation nor will aesthetics 
be a form of life in which they participate. The only 
relationship that an aspect-blind person will have to 
an art object will be his perception of that object and 
his ability to describe that perception, or to copy or 
replicate it in words or in a drawing. The mention of 
any aspects in such a description will be purely acci-
dental and will not be a result of their having been 
noticed. The expressive character of the art object as 
a work of art will be inaccessible to the aspect-blind 
person, and the only possible function that art objects 
could play in such a person's life would be as working 
drawings (or working sounds or working motions). Thus, 
"(t)he 'aspect-blind' will have an altogether different 
relationship to pictures (likewise music, poetry, 
dance, etc.) than ours." (Philosophical Investi-
gations, Ilxi, p. 214). We might say that artworks 
will have no significance for him. He will be able to 
do things with them; i.e. treat them as working 
materials. If he is able to work with them, he should 
be able to carry out an order like, 'Bring me something 
that looks like this'. His ability to carry out very 
simple, very ordinary everyday tasks should not be 
impaired. The example fails to accentuate the extent 
to which the aspect-blind person is cut off from aes-
thetics and the art world. The severance is total. 
What a person can do with art objects when they are not 
art for him is extremely limited, and at any rate has 
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nothing to do with their being art. Therefore, even as 
purely physical objects, they exist as a relatively 
useless realm of entities for him. 
Aspect-blindness is a purely hypothetical idea. 
Wittgenstein conjures up the concept to make a point, 
and clearly does not v/ant to push it any farther than 
is necessary, because in a culture with our forms of 
life, and the language-games we play, I think he would 
admit that it is a conceptual impossibility. Yet the 
concept is illustratively effective. We are not as-
pect-blind; we notice aspects. We see things as things 
that they perceptually are not. One of the things that 
we do, in fact, see things as, is art. Thus, seeing 
art objects as art is part of our culture. It is a 
form of life for us. Art (aesthetics) is intimately 
intertwined with other forms of life, so that to under-
stand art, or to experience it with some degree of in-
formed appreciation, we have to understand many things 
about the way that we live. We notice aspects of the 
artworks we experience because or if we have a back-
ground through which we can appreciate them, through 
which they are familiar to us. So we play our 
language-games of appreciation and we make gestures and 
comparisons, and we notice relationships and similari-
ties, and thus art, for us, is alive. It is expres-
sive. If we take it as expressive, it never leaves us 
untouched. 
Wittgenstein may not have solved all philosophical 
problems, but what he has lighted upon, he has made 
simple. Here I have tried to show the simplicity of a 
theory of art which can be developed from an extension 
of several of his central ideas. Its simplicity lies 
in showing how confusions about art are conceptual, 
thus leaving the complexity and beauty of aesthetic ex-
perience untouched. 
NOTES 
"Art' and 'art object' will be strictly dichoto-
mized, and defined shortly. 'Artwork' will at times 
seem to vacillate in meaning between these two poles; 
however, I mean by this term the physical art object 
which is accepted as art. Its use is consistent with 
this definition which will be elaborated upon. 
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